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IX. ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED IN ITS ORDER ENTERED SEPTEMBER 16, 
2002, AS THE BAD ACTS ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANTS WERE 
CONTINUING ACTIVITIES THAT CAME TO LIGHT IN 1998 
Appellees properly note that the summary judgment order dismissing most of Nancy 
Steen-Adams' derivative claims, Addendum Ex. 3, TCR 3042-65, was in effect re-litigated 
in the court trial. The principal issue therefore becomes whether or not the trial court 
properly applied the statute of limitations. Appellees reference parts of the record and 
findings of the court whereby the court generally states that Nancy Steen-Adams was on 
inquiry notice such that she should have known more than three years prior to filing her 
complaint that Mi Vida did not have an interest in any of the real property which ultimately 
was sold to Boulder County for $2.7 million in 2001. Mi Vida further claims that "there was 
never a reasonable claim that Mark A. Steen had purchased property in trust for Mi Vida." 
Mi Vida Brief, p. 14. 
Contrary to Mi Vida's assertion, Mark A. Steen represented that he was an agent 
holding title to real property in his name for some type of business entity where Mi Vida was 
a joint venturer, partner or general partner in the limited partnership. See Gold Hill Venture 
Agreement, Exhibit A to Nancy Steen-Adams' Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third Party 
Complaint, Trial Exhibit 462; Harris, January 26, 1983 letter, Exhibit C to Nancy Steen-
Adams' Counterclaims, Cross Claims and Third Party Complaint, Trial Exhibit 462; Mi 
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Vida Shareholder Minutes, 1987, pp. 134-6, Exhibit 7 to Summary Judgment Motion TCR 
2142-2146; Mi Vida Shareholder Minutes, 1989, pp. 56-60, Exhibit K of Exhibits for 
Dissident Shareholders, TCR 3479. 
Mark Steen, himself, led the shareholders to believe that Mi Vida had an interest in 
these properties. At the July 8, 1989 Mi Vida Shareholders meeting, Mark Steen reassured 
the shareholders that the only property he owned in Boulder County was his condominium 
in Longmont, Colorado. Exhibits for Dissident Shareholders, TCR 3479 at Exhibit K, p. 57, 
11. 13-15. He further stated that all the other property in Boulder County in Mark Steen's 
name was held in his name as agent for the limited partnership. Id. p. 57, I 19, p. 58, I 1. 
Mark Steen conceded that the property where the mill site sits on the Oscar Load was 
acquired by Gold Hill Ventures in his name as part of the joint venture property acquisition. 
Id. p. 67,11. 11-14. In addition, Mark Steen stated "I was purchasing the properties as agent 
for the mining partnership." Id. p. 68, 11. 18-19. 
There is no question that in 1989 Nancy Steen-Adams and other shareholders were 
led to believe that Mi Vida was in some type of partnership, and that Mark Steen was 
holding title to partnership property in his own name. Mark Steen was in a fiduciary 
relationship to the shareholders. The existence of a fiduciary relationship may give rise to 
a duty to disclose, relieving the injured party of the burden of showing an affirmative 
deception to postpone the running of the statute of limitations. Snortland v. State, 615 
N.W.2d 574, 578 (N.D. 2000). The Indiana supreme court has found that the doctrine of 
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fraudulent concealment "operates to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations 
defense when that person, by deception or violation of a duty has concealed material from 
the plaintiff thereby preventing discovery of a wrongdoing." Leburn v. D. W. Connor, Jr., 
702 NE.2d 754, 757 (Ind. 1998). In shareholders derivative actions, the statute of 
limitations is tolled until disclosure or discovery of director's wrongful conduct, where the 
directors violate their fiduciary duty to operate their corporation fairly, honestly and openly. 
Lowry v. Lowry, 590 NE.2d 612, 617-18 (Ind. App. 1992). 
Nancy Steen-Adams has asserted derivative claims which were dismissed on the basis 
of notice she should have received in 1991 or 1994. She denied receiving that notice; 
however, the court as trier of fact held otherwise. Attorney's fees were awarded to Mi Vida 
and Mark Steen as a result of her bringing these claims which were determined to be beyond 
the statute of limitations. As a result of the fiduciary relationship between Mark Steen as a 
controlling officer and director, Nancy Steen-Adams had a reasonable basis to bring these 
claims, and the statute of limitations was tolled until the full extent and nature of these many 
wrongdoings was shown. 
2. THE ISSUE OF 54(b) CERTIFICATION IS MOOT 
The court of appeals has ruled that the trial court's certification under Rule 54(b) has 
been rendered moot. See Order of Consolidation dated February 20, 2004. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT NANCY STEEN-
ADAMS AND CHARLES STEEN III HAD AN IMPROPER PURPOSE AND 
LACK OF MERIT IN FILING THEIR ACTION FOR DISSOLUTION AND 
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RECEIVERSHIP IN COLORADO AS MI VIDA AND MARK STEEN HAVE 
A SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP WITH BOULDER COUNTY, 
COLORADO 
Nancy Steen-Adams and Charles III initially filed their action in Boulder County 
because that is where the defendants reside, where Mi Vida has its principal place of 
business and from where it conducts business, where Mi Vida's subject assets are located, 
and where property owned by Mark Steen's Colorado companies is located. These facts are 
noted in Judge Bailin's Order denying the Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 
filed by Mark Steen, John Steen, Charles Steen, Sr., Mi Vida, and Mark Steen's Colorado 
Companies. Addendum Exhibit 1, pp. 4, 7, 12. 
Prior to filing the action in Colorado, the plaintiffs requested a full accounting at least 
three times from the defendants as authorized by Colorado (and Utah) law, but the 
defendants chose to ignore those requests. Trial Court Exhibit B-l, Exhibit 17. A buy-out 
under circumstances where the plaintiffs were blocked from determining the true value of 
their shares was impossible. Moreover, Colorado corporate law does not include aprovision 
requiring a buy-out, and therefore the plaintiffs pursued their lawful option of pursuing 
dissolution and receivership. 
Nonetheless, the trial court found that the appellants filed their complaint in Colorado 
and pursued dissolution and receivership for an improper purpose and without merit. In 
their brief, Mi Vida and Mark Steen assert that the impropriety committed by the hands of 
Nancy Steen Adams framed as "fraud" was the fact that Nancy signed an amended verified 
4 
complaint that mistakenly included the same misrepresentations verified by her former co-
plaintiff Charles Jr. That error was harmless and did not establish grounds for the court's 
conclusion that she and Charles III brought their action for an improper purpose or lacked 
merit. The facts are clear that the Colorado plaintiffs and defendants had such significant 
contacts with the state of Colorado that it was proper and justified to bring their action in 
Colorado and therefore the ruling from the Utah trial court finding that appellants abused 
process by filing their complaint in Colorado and seeking dissolution and receivership is 
therefore clearly erroneous. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT NANCY STEEN-
ADAMS AND CHARLES STEEN III HAD NO REASONABLE CAUSE TO 
ASSERT THEIR DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST MI VIDA IN 
COLORADO 
This issue is argued in issues 5 and 6 below. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT UTAH LAW 
APPLIED TO CLAIMS BROUGHT BY APPELLANTS IN COLORADO 
RATHER THAN COLORADO LAW 
In determining whether Nancy Steen Adams and Charles Steen III abused the civil 
process by bringing their claims in Colorado, the trial court applied Utah law in its analysis. 
Assessing fees for the attempt to dissolve Mi Vida in Colorado and for the 
appointment of a receiver against this Utah corporation, do not technically fall 
under the derivative statute, and must be based on an abuse of process, 
[U.R.C.P.] Rule 11 or [U.C.A.] § 78-27-56 basis. And I find there was an 
improper purpose and a lack of merit to the pursuit of the Colorado litigation in 
Colorado. 
Addendum Exhibit 4, p. 30; TCRp. 3718 (emphasis added). 
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The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws addresses what state's law should be 
applied in determining whether there was an abuse of process. 
The rights and liabilities of the parties for malicious prosecution or abuse of 
process are determined by the local law of the state where the proceeding 
complained of occurred, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other 
state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the 
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be 
applied. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of I .aw s § 155 (1971) (IV lalit ious Proseci ition ai id,.,,,/ "Vbiise 
of Process) (the "Restatement"). 
Mi Vida and Mark Steen claim that the dissolution and receivership proceedings 
brought in Colorado were for an improper purpose and without merit. I he court applied 
Utah .:• • . ;v- aaa liv.i Nancy and Charles (•. >;IM-. I • Iv.1 pr- • • '-s by bringing those claims 
for an improper purpose and without merit. Those claims were brought in Colorado because 
all defendants reside in Colorado, and the alleged torts took place in Colorado, and Mi 
Vida's principle place of business is in Coloi ado, the si ibject assets are located in Colorado, 
ai id tl le Colorado con lpanies ow ned by Mark Steen owned significant real property in 
Colorado. The law the trial court should have applied, therefore, was Colorado law. 
To prove a claim of abuse of process, Colorado law not only requires an ulterior 
pi lrpose for tl le i ise of tl i,e ji idicial proceedings and. willful :. ' -,>n in the use of that process 
which is not proper in the regular course of the proceedings, but also requires 
"accomplishing a coercive goal that is not the intended legal purpose of the process." 
American Guarantee and Liability Ins. *~ '-' ' " • ' ' . , ^ 2004) 
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(emphasis added) (citing James H. Moore & Assoc. Realty, Inc. v. Arrowhead at Vail 892 
P. 2d 367 (Colo. App. 1994)). Here, no "goal" was achieved by avoiding Utah buy-out rights 
by instituting dissolution and receivership. Simply stated, the action had the legitimate 
purpose of having one lawsuit in one jurisdiction. 
6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT MARK 
STEEN BREACHED THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO MI VIDA AND 
NANCY STEEN-ADAMS, DISMISSED THE DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AND 
AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS IN EXCESS OF $250,000 
AGAINST NANCY STEEN-ADAMS. 
Appellants argue that there were numerous breaches of fiduciary duties which the 
trial court should have recognized and that no attorney's fees should have been awarded 
against Nancy Steen-Adams relating to her claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Appellees 
refute Ms. Steen-Adams' arguments stating that the trial court record supports the award of 
attorney's fees and that any wrongdoing of Mark Steen was effectively inconsequential as 
the valuation of Ms. Steen-Adams' shares adjusted for any of these alleged wrongdoings. 
Appellants asserted that Mark Steen breached his fiduciary duties by failing to 
provide a proper accounting. Mi Vida and Mark Steen claimed that the accounting cause 
of action was dropped. The trial court agreed with appellees and failed to find any 
wrongdoing on behalf of Mi Vida or Mark Steen for a lack of accounting. A review of 
Nancy Steen-Adams' counterclaim, cross claim and third party complaint, Trial Exhibit 462, 
plainly shows that the accounting claim was made against Mi Vida and remained throughout 
the case. Exhibit 462, at p. 16-17 puts forth the accounting claim. The claim is clearly 
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stated in Nancy Steen-Adams' third claim for relief at page 16, Trial Court Exhibit 462, pp. 
16-17. This claim is specifically stated at paragraph 52 on page 17 wherein it states: 
The minority shareholders request i:;..i .\U:K~ • >n . •.: * LKIC^ ^ 
compelled to account for their conduct in the management of Mi Vida and that 
they pay over to Mi Vida all benefits, profits and property of Mi Vida 
wrongfully appropriated by them; and (b) that Mark Steen companies be 
compelled to i'-M::!! »' ^ :my assets < . yj-.^u-'-' ;cs >: Mi Vidawhn 1* ' ;ey 
received, and disgorged such assets or opportunities and any profits derived 
therefrom to Mi Vida. 
I he prayer for relief requests an award to the n lii 101 ity si latciuilders "together with 
declaratory judgment and accounting, as requested above." Id. 
There can be no question that Nancy Steen-Adams requested an accounting. It is 
unchallenged that Mi Vida was consistently late with its tax returns and Ms. Steen-Adams 
was never provided i any tax retnrM ; ^ ] le year ei idii lg Ji n le 30, 1999 or year emlhy. 
June 30, 2000, much less the most current returns. See Summary Trial Exhibit 616y 
Addendum, Exhibit 7. Additionally, the general ledger records for at least the last nine 
months were never provide. .\- • HI;:I-.U U- \;HIL\ M,-U -.\.. :ms. 
The record is clear that Mark Steen and Mi Vida never made any distributions to 
Nancy Steen-Adams and that she was excluded from any advances or other benefits which 
the rest of the family shared. This is clearly a breach of fiduciary duty. More importantly, 
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Mark Steen's acquisition of the Continental Bank and Trust note was an acquisition of a Mi 
Vida asset at a much discounted price. This wrongdoing was once again a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Appellees' argument that it occurred after the valuation date is simply 
incorrect. The agreement was made on the date of valuation although not effected until 
some time thereafter. It is a clear cut breach of fiduciary duty. 
Mark Steen, in his appellee brief, repeatedly argues that Nancy Steen-Adams abused 
the civil process by filing the initial complaint in Colorado thus depriving Mi Vida and the 
other shareholders of their right to buy out the dissenting shareholders. Neither appellee 
presents any document showing that Nancy Steen-Adams purposefully used the Colorado 
forum for the purpose of depriving Mi Vida and Mr. Steen of said rights; rather, appellees 
infer and attempt to create this malice by repeatedly restating the claim. Mark Steen and Mi 
Vida failed to acknowledge the true jurisdictional dilemma original counsel, Jeff Reiman, 
faced in drafting the first complaint. That complaint, Trial Court Exhibit Bl, included 
claims against Mark Steen, John Steen and Charles Steen - three Colorado residents, and 
four Colorado corporations, Southern Cross Prospecting Company, Inc., Gold Leaf Mining 
Company, Inc., Gold Hill Mines, Inc. and Golden Tontine, LLC. The 29 page verified 
complaint had 18 exhibits attached to it. A review of that initial complaint shows the 
considerable, studied research by Mr. Reiman in drafting the complaint when faced with 
multiple parties in multiple jurisdictions. 
The original attorneys representing Nancy Steen-Adams had a difficult task in 
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attempting to determine what had transpired with Mi Vida and the properties Mark Steen, 
John Steen and others had acquired. Similarly, the second set of attorneys -principally John 
Sanders, also had a difficult task when he i: u *. the counterclaim, cross claim and third party 
complaint on January 31, 2001, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 462. '...: j " .^ .. ..• A :/*U nU» 
had four exhibits referencing various suspect real estate transactions by the Colorado 
corporations. Only when the parties stipulated that the four corporate entities would be part 
of the Utah litigation was it feasiK! = ' r, oring all the clain is ii 11 to il i See Trial Court Exhibit 
B-13. 
These types of strategy decisions should not be twisted into a tort or an award of fees against 
Ms. Steen-Adams. 
:> :i CONCLUSION 
Appellants, in their brief and this reply, have shown this court that they were 
confronted with a difficult procedural issue in determining where the initial complaint 
should be filed. Boi llder Coi inty District G• ••: todge Bai^ ' v-d sufficient evid^w •'•» 
allow the complaint to stand in Boulder County. When Mi Vida and Mark Steen filed their 
action in Utah, they agreed to jurisdiction over the Mark Steen companies. This solved the 
subject matter jurisdiction problem win..; _ ..:.. I \u ...;\ c DCCH . .IHCUKG win LU.A a HM,.O 
filing. Nancy Steen-Adams has made a sufficient showing that she did not have the requisite 
malice necessary for award of attorneys fees against her. The court should remand this case 
to the trial court for a re-determination of the appropriate attorneys fees under the 
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appropriate law. 
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